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 The End of Bankruptcy 
Douglas G. Baird* & Robert K. Rasmussen** 
ABSTRACT 
The law of corporate reorganizations is conventionally justified as a way to preserve a firm’s 
going-concern value: Specialized assets in a particular firm are worth more together in that firm 
than anywhere else. This paper shows that this notion is mistaken. Its flaw is that it lacks a well-
developed understanding of the nature of a firm. Initially, it is easy to confuse size with speciali-
zation and overstate the extent to which assets are dedicated to a particular enterprise. Even 
when such dedicated assets exist, they often do not need to stay in the same firm. As Coase 
taught us, as the costs of contracting go down, so too does the value of keeping assets in a par-
ticular firm.  
But even when specialized assets must be kept inside a firm, two other forces limit the need 
for a traditional law of corporate reorganizations. Capital structures are increasingly designed 
with financial distress in mind. For these firms, control rights shift from one set of investors to 
another as the firm encounters difficulty. Such firms either never file for bankruptcy, or, if they 
do, it is only to vindicate the predetermined allocation of control rights. Even where control 
rights are not sensibly allocated, a quick sale of the firm restores order. When firms can be sold 
as going concerns, the need for the traditional negotiated plan of reorganization disappears.  
The vast majority of firms in financial distress never enter bankruptcy. Today the Chapter 11 
of a large firm is an auction of the assets, followed by litigation over the proceeds. To the extent 
we understand the law of corporate reorganizations as providing a collective forum in which 
creditors and their common debtor fashion a future for a firm that would otherwise be torn apart 
by financial distress, we may safely conclude that its era has come to an end. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make head-
lines when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from 
imminent failure. Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the pro-
ceeds. TWA filed only to consummate the sale of its planes and landing gates to Ameri-
can Airlines.1 Enron’s principal assets, including its trading operation and its most valu-
able pipelines, were sold within a few months of its bankruptcy petition.2 Within weeks 
of filing for Chapter 11, Budget sold most of its assets to the parent company of Avis.3 
Similarly, Polaroid entered Chapter 11 and sold most of its assets to the private equity 
group at BankOne.4 Even when a large firm uses Chapter 11 as something other than a 
convenient auction block, its principal lenders are usually already in control and Chap-
ter 11 merely puts in place a pre-existing deal.5 Rarely is Chapter 11 a forum where the 
various stakeholders in a publicly held firm negotiate among each other over the firm’s 
destiny. 
Large firms, of course, form only a tiny portion of the Chapter 11 docket.6 For the 
vast majority of firms in financial trouble, the traditional corporate reorganization has 
become increasingly irrelevant. Of the half a million firms that will fail this year, only 
10,000 will file for Chapter 11, half of what we saw a decade ago.7 The typical case is the 
                                                 
1. See Susan Carey, American Airlines’, TWA Financing Plan Is Approved, Although Rivals Cry Foul, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at A3. 
2. The court approved the sale of Enron’s trading operation only a few weeks after the bankruptcy pe-
tition was filed. See PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 178 (2002). Enron 
completed its sale of its major pipeline to Dynergy in the first months of the bankruptcy as well. See Dynergy 
to Pay Enron a $25 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at C4. The sale of other assets also took place. 
See, e.g., Jeff St. Onge & Christopher Mumma, Enron’s $358 Mln Wind-Asset Sale to GE is Approved, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 11, 2002. In March 2002, Enron agreed to sell U.K. water utility Wessex Water to 
Malaysia’s YTL Corp. for $1.77 billion in cash and assumed debt. Enron’s European coal-trading, metals-
trading, and retail-supply units have also been sold. See Margot Habiby, Enron CEO Says Debt, Other Claims 
May Total $100 Bln, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 12, 2002. Plans are underway to sell most of what remains by the 
end of the year. See Neela Banerjee, Enron to Sell Major Units to Raise Cash for Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2002, at C1. For a more detailed application of the ideas developed in this Article to the Enron bankruptcy, 
see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 Vand. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2002). 
3. See Cendant, Owner of Avis, to Acquire Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at C3. 
4. See James Bandler, Polaroid Plans to Sell its Assets for $265 Million, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at A17. 
5. A recent and altogether typical example is the August 2002 Chapter 11 filing of medical test maker 
Dade Behrning Inc. See Bruce Japsen, Dade Behring Seeks to Reorganize, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2002, § 3, at 1. The 
other large category of public Chapter 11 cases involves firms that once manufactured asbestos. See Christo-
pher Bowe, Grace Seeks Bankruptcy Deal; Chemical’s U.S. Group Hit by Mounting Asbestos Claims, FIN. TIMES, 
(London) Apr. 3, 2001, at 30 (noting that companies filing for bankruptcy as a result of asbestos liability 
within previous 12 months include W.R. Grace, Babcock & Wilcox, Pittsburgh-Corning, Owens Corning, 
Armstrong, and G-1 Holdings, formerly GAF). Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code provides these firms 
with an ability to dispose of these claims that is available nowhere else. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g) (West 2002). 
6. Such bankruptcies, however, do account for a substantial amount of the assets and employees that 
visit the bankruptcy forum. 
7. See 2001 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 9 (reporting 23,989 Chapter 11 filings in 1991 and 9884 
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 electrical subcontractor who uses the bankruptcy forum to cut a deal with the I.R.S. 
while keeping other creditors at bay.8 Marginally competent owner-managers, bureau-
cratically inept tax collectors, small-time landlords and suppliers, and unsophisticated 
workers and tort victims populate this world.9 The business is run out of a small office 
with little in the way of hard assets and few long-term employees. To the extent we un-
derstand the law of corporate reorganizations as providing a collective forum in which 
creditors and their common debtor fashion a future for a firm that would otherwise be 
torn apart by financial distress, we may safely conclude that its era has come to an end. 
This Article takes on the job of accounting for this new state of affairs. Our approach 
departs from much of recent bankruptcy scholarship in two important respects.10 Most 
recent debates about corporate reorganizations have focused upon capital structures and 
priority rights.11 People have argued about the extent to which nonbankruptcy priority 
rights are or should be vindicated in bankruptcy and what is the best mechanism for do-
ing so.12 The tools of modern finance have been front and center. We show that this ap-
proach neglects foundational questions about the nature of the firm itself. One should 
not ask about the shape the firm’s capital structure should take without understanding 
first why the assets in question should be located within a particular firm. In other 
words, rather than beginning with Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance propositions and 
Black-Scholes option pricing, scholars of corporate reorganization should start with 
Ronald Coase and The Nature of the Firm. 
This Article differs from much of recent bankruptcy scholarship in a second respect. 
Rather than use the nineteenth-century railroad as the paradigmatic example of a firm 
                                                                                                                                     
in 2000). 
8. An owner-manager of a small business in trouble too often uses funds earmarked for employee 
withholding taxes and social security payments to keep the business’s doors open. See Edward R. Morrison, 
Bankruptcy Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). Because owner-managers are personally liable for these debts, they are especially anxious to cut a 
deal. 
9. For a comprehensive account of the Chapter 11 docket of one bankruptcy court over the course of an 
entire year, see Morrison, supra note 8. 
10. For a survey of modern bankruptcy scholarship, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested 
Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998). As we make plain below, a number of the observations we bring together in 
this Article are immanent in the work of others, especially Barry Adler, Marcus Cole, Randy Picker, and 
David Skeel. 
11. Among the best known of these efforts among law and economics scholars is Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988). Among more traditional bank-
ruptcy scholars, priority rules (and in particular the absolute priority rule) have been the central focus as 
well. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989); Randolph J. 
Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387 (1998); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auc-
tions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 84-85 (1991). 
12. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 
YALE L.J. 83 (2001); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807 
(1998); Philippe Aghion Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
523 (1992); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 
(1983). 
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 that needs to be reorganized,13 we use a large number of alternative examples, drawn 
from both history and recent events, from the Lancaster cotton mill to the automobile 
assembly plant to the modern dot-com. By using historical examples of prototypical in-
dustrial firms, we show that the basic forces that undermine the usefulness of the rail-
road paradigm have been in place for a long time. The modern examples show how 
these forces have accelerated over the last twenty years. 
Part I establishes the basic framework. It connects the concept of going-concern 
value to the nature of the firm and transaction costs. There is no special magic beyond 
transaction costs in accounting for any particular collection of assets assembled within a 
single firm. From this familiar point, it follows that transaction costs themselves put a 
ceiling on the value of keeping different assets together in the same firm. By importing 
this well-known insight into the world of corporate reorganizations, we focus squarely 
on the central idea in corporate reorganizations, that of preserving the “going-concern 
surplus,” preserving the value a firm has above and beyond the liquidation value of its 
discrete assets. 
Part II explains why firms in financial distress are unlikely to have a substantial go-
ing concern surplus. Such a surplus comes from assets that are dedicated to a particular 
purpose. Current law is predicated on the belief that financially distressed firms hold 
such assets. The oft-quoted phrase is that, absent bankruptcy law, a firm’s assets would 
be “sold for scrap”14 and value would be lost. Railroads provide an especially vivid illus-
tration. The left-hand rails are worth little apart from the right-hand rails. We show that 
this example is misleading. Even at the height of the industrial revolution, railroads 
were a special case. Most firms did not depend upon assets that were custom-made for 
its operations and not of use elsewhere. The railroad paradigm makes even less sense 
today. In a service-based economy, intangible assets, such as a firm’s proprietary busi-
ness methods, are the assets most likely to be dedicated to a particular firm. Such assets, 
however, are precisely those that are likely to have little value when a firm is in financial 
distress. Many modern markets have a winner-take-all character. A hundred years ago a 
railroad that connected to small cities might be less successful and less profitable than a 
railroad that connected two larger cities. By contrast, today a bookstore or an office sup-
ply store with a business plan that is only slightly worse than a competitor’s might not 
                                                 
13. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 48-69 (2001). 
14. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“In proceedings under the reor-
ganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled enterprise may be restructured to enable it to op-
erate successfully in the future. Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if 
used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap.’”); MARK S. SCARBERRY, KENNETH N. KLEE, GRANT W. 
NEWTON & STEVE H. NICKLES, BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 1-2 (2d ed. 2001) (“Chapter 11 of the 
federal Bankruptcy Code gives financially distressed businesses an opportunity to reorganize and avoid 
liquidation. Liquidation of a business’s assets can be very costly to the persons directly involved and to soci-
ety. Keeping the business in operation will often be much more desirable than liquidating it. The fundamen-
tal premise of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that reorganization is desirable.”); ROBERT L. JORDAN, 
WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 633 (5th ed. 1999) (“Society is better off also when a 
firm that is worth more alive than dead is successfully rehabilitated.”). 
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 be able to survive at all. 
Part III shows that even when an economic enterprise depends on dedicated assets, 
rarely do the assets themselves need to remain in a particular firm. An economic enter-
prise may require collaboration among a particular group of highly skilled workers, but 
they do not need to work for the same firm, nor does their ability to work together de-
pend on the continuation of any given firm. To make these points, we again draw on a 
number of different examples. We focus in particular on examples from the early history 
of the automobile industry. Even here, where it is commonly assumed that highly spe-
cialized assets require vertical integration of production within a single firm,15 keeping 
assets together in a single firm was not in fact so important.16 
Part IV suggests that law of corporate reorganizations as traditionally conceived no 
longer matters much even in the rare case in which a valuable economic enterprise re-
quires that dedicated assets be locked up in a single firm. Two things have changed in 
recent times. Investors in nineteenth-century railroads relied on primitive investment 
contracts that scarcely differed from real estate mortgages. Today’s investors allocate 
control rights among themselves through elaborate and sophisticated contracts that al-
ready anticipate financial distress. In the presence of these contracts, a law of corporate 
reorganizations is largely unnecessary.17 As long as the parties whose interests are at 
stake have already decided among themselves what will happen in bad states of the 
world, nothing is to be gained by second-guessing them. 
A second development makes corporate reorganizations less important. In the nine-
teenth century, no single group of investors could amass the capital needed to buy large 
firms, and the market for small ones was undeveloped. Today, both small and large 
firms can be sold as going concerns, inside of bankruptcy and out. The ability to sell en-
tire firms and divisions eliminates the need for a collective forum in which the different 
players must come to an agreement about what should happen to the assets. That deci-
                                                 
15. See Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & 
ECON. 33, 34 (2000) (“Most accounts focus on physical assets, arguing that vertical integration is driven by 
investment in specialized plant and equipment.”). Indeed, the notion now widespread among economists 
that asset specificity drives vertical integration started with the example of General Motors’ acquisition of 
Fisher Body. See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 307-10 (1978). 
16. We reject the conventional wisdom that asset-specificity drives vertical integration, and our views 
are inconsistent with the assertions a number of economists have made about General Motors’ acquisition of 
Fisher Body. One of us explains at greater length elsewhere how these economists were led astray. See 
Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). But the basic story and the con-
temporaneous evidence economists overlooked are set out below. See infra note 119. Our basic observations 
here (and elsewhere) are, not surprisingly, consistent with what Ronald Coase has said for many decades. 
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 34, 45 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993) (quoting from a letter he wrote in 
1932). 
17. When involuntary tort victims loom large in the capital structure, of course, we cannot rely upon 
contracts to sort things out. It is no accident that asbestos cases now are a significant part of the Chapter 11 
docket involving large firms. See Bowe, supra note 5. 
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 sion can be left to the new owners.18 
We conclude with a few brief observations about small firms and corporate reor-
ganizations. Small firms constitute the vast bulk of Chapter 11 filings in sheer numbers, 
but the total amount of assets at risk for most firms that enter Chapter 11 are modest 
relative to the large firms in Chapter 11.19 In the typical small Chapter 11 filing, the 
bankruptcy judge is asked to decide whether the plumber, travel agent, or jeweler 
should be given another chance to run her small business. We suggest that the debate 
focus squarely upon whether its benefits (which inure largely to owner-managers who 
derive psychic income from running their own business) justify its costs (which fall 
upon tax collectors, unpaid workers, and others who are poorly positioned to bear risk). 
Each of the independent strands of analysis we develop in this Article reinforces the 
others. In the aggregate, they explain what bankruptcy judges and practitioners have 
increasingly come to recognize: The face of bankruptcy practice has changed dramati-
cally over the last decade. To show how fundamental the change has been, however, we 
must first locate the law of corporate reorganizations with a coherent theory of the firm. 
This is the task to which we turn in Part I. 
I. CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 
In the fall of 1931, a twenty-year-old undergraduate left England to spend the year in 
the United States on a traveling fellowship.20 The trip was in lieu of a final year at the 
London School of Economics. His research project was both simple and topical. Lenin 
had boasted that he would turn the Soviet Union into one giant factory.21 This under-
graduate wanted to write an essay explaining why such an ambition was doomed to fail. 
There were, of course, large firms. Henry Ford built the giant River Rouge Works. Iron 
ore began at one end, and cars emerged at the other. Nevertheless, it would seem that 
there had to be some natural limit on the size of an enterprise. 
This undergraduate believed that by spending a year touring the United States to in-
terview its entrepreneurs and economists, he would be able to show why factories could 
not become arbitrarily large.22 He soon discovered, however, that he had to be able to 
answer other questions as well. Why were large firms needed at all? What prevented 
production from taking place through transactions among arbitrarily small firms in the 
                                                 
18. Enron provides an example. The market for energy trading shrank in the first half of 2002, but the 
decision about whether to cut back Enron’s trading operations did not have to be made in the bankruptcy 
court. Instead, the decision rested with the new buyer. See UBS Warburg Cuts Division Staffed by Team at En-
ron, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2002, at C9. As a result, the bankruptcy court can focus on what it does best—
allocating responsibility for the frauds and misdeeds that brought about the bankruptcy. 
19. The vast majority of firms in Chapter 11 have less than $1 million in assets. These aggregated to-
gether constitute a smaller pool of assets than one finds just in the two or three largest Chapter 11 cases each 
year. See Morrison, supra note 8. 
20. See Coase, supra note 16, at 38-39. 
21. See id. at 38. 
22. See id. at 38-39. 
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 marketplace? Indeed, what was the difference between activity inside a firm and outside 
it? One could make no progress on his initial question or any of the others without first 
gaining some purchase on the nature of the firm. This task was quite beyond the reach of 
an ordinary undergraduate. Ronald Coase, however, was no ordinary undergraduate.23 
The insights Coase developed during his trip must be the starting place for those 
who ask foundational questions about the structure of corporations. The transaction cost 
literature spawned by Coase now dominates the theory of the firm.24 Where an activity 
takes place—inside a firm or between two firms in the market—turns solely on a ques-
tion of comparative advantage. The touchstone is which method of organizing allows 
the activity to be done more cheaply. This in turn depends on the relative transaction 
costs of the potential organizational routes. 
Much of this literature in recent years has focused on the elusive boundary between 
transactions in the firm and in the marketplace. A firm itself can be understood as a 
nexus of contracts.25 Left largely unexplored, however, has been the relationship be-
tween the formal legal entity such as a corporation and the economic idea of a “firm.” 
While perhaps of little moment to economists, it is all important to a coherent account of 
the law of corporate reorganizations. The law clearly demarcates which assets belong to 
which legal entities. A Chapter 11 petition raises the question whether the assets that 
legally belong to this firm should remain with this firm.26 Coase asked the question of 
what explained whether a transaction would be located in a firm or in the market.27 In 
the same spirit, reorganization law ought to begin by ascertaining the value of keeping 
particular assets together inside a given firm. (The alternative is for these assets to be re-
turned to the market, where they may be reassembled in whole or in part in another 
firm.) We have a going-concern surplus (the thing the law of corporate reorganizations 
                                                 
23. The paper that emerged from the trip was R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937). This paper was in large part responsible for the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics being awarded 
to Coase in 1991. 
24. See HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM 144 (1988). Major works in this vein in-
clude OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CON-
TRACTING (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Sanford J. Grossman & 
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
691 (1986); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988). 
 Property rights theory is a further development of these ideas. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119 (1990). For an overview of the development of this literature, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. 
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Powers: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 
1630-36 (2001). 
25. This idea was first set out in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
26. Indeed, large firms today increasingly consist of affiliated groups of legally distinct corporations. 
Adroit use of corporations allow investors to ensure that some of an enterprise’s assets never enter the bank-
ruptcy forum. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITI-
ZATION (2d ed. 1993). 
27. See Coase, supra note 23, at 390-92. 
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 exists to preserve) only to the extent there are assets that are worth more if located 
within an existing firm. If all the assets can be used as well elsewhere, the firm has no 
value as a going concern.28 In the next two Parts, we show that such assets are increas-
ingly hard to find. Even if certain assets are best used together with other assets, it often 
does not matter whether these assets are used in conjunction with other assets in a par-
ticular existing firm, or whether they are moved to an altogether different one. 
II. FIRMS AND DEDICATED ASSETS 
In this Part, we begin by delineating the attributes of financially distressed railroads 
that necessitated a law of corporate reorganizations. These corporations had dedicated 
assets that were being put to their highest valued use. While railroads have remained 
the common paradigm for corporate reorganizations, they were in fact not representa-
tive of firms in the Industrial Age. We examine the archetypal firm of the period and 
show that it depended relatively little on specialized assets. In our own time, specialized 
assets matter even less. The specialized assets of a firm today are often intangible, such 
as its business know-how. In a winner-take-all economy, such assets are likely to have 
value only for the firms that flourish and not the ones that encounter financial distress. 
A.  Railroads and Going-Concern Value 
The usual account of the law of corporate reorganizations assumes that firms today 
that cannot pay their obligations are like the nineteenth-century railroads. 29 At its incep-
tion in the late nineteenth century, the law of corporate reorganizations focused exclu-
sively on railroads. Many railroads turned an operating profit, but could not hope to re-
coup their construction costs.30 Their assets were being put to their highest and best use. 
Indeed, the iron rails and wooden ties connecting two cities had no use other than as a 
railroad. In addition, the railroads lacked a coherent capital structure. In the course of 
their construction, railroads issued dozens of different types of investment instruments, 
putting up different stretches of track and other assets as collateral for each bond.31 
The options for dealing with an economically sound but financially distressed rail-
road in the nineteenth century were limited. A cash sale was simply out of the question. 
                                                 
28. Human capital, of course, is one of the assets located inside a firm. 
29. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 393, 397-408 (discussing how the moden law of corporate reorganizations evolved through judicial 
decisions). 
30. For detailed descriptions of this history, see SKEEL, supra note 13, at 48-69; Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 925-36 (2001). 
31. See, e.g., STUART DAGGETT, RAILROAD REORGANIZATION 196-200 (1908) (noting that by 1889, the At-
chison, Topeka, and Santa Fe had 7010 miles of track and 41 different types of bonds, each secured by differ-
ent assets); 2 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-1948, at 169 (1948) (stating 
that the Frisco had 30 different issues of securities other than equipment trusts and terminal bonds, most of 
them secured by liens on single constituent lines). 
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 It cost $20,000 to $30,000 to build a single mile of track on the Great Plains.32 In more dif-
ficult terrain, the cost would be $80,000 or more.33 No single individual or group of indi-
viduals could amass sufficient capital to buy an established line as a unit. The law of 
corporate reorganizations came into being as a result. Lawyers and the investment 
bankers who sold the bonds in the first instance created it by extending the existing legal 
device of an equity receivership.34 As the receivership developed, its salient features 
emerged: a stay of the collection activity of creditors, the infusion of operating funds, 
and negotiations among representatives of the various debtholders over a new capital 
structure. Judges entered the picture to resolve disputes and ensure the agreed-upon 
capital structure was fair and equitable to those who dissented. 
Modern Chapter 11 derives its principal features from the equity receivership. The 
assumption that the railroad is the prototypical firm in financial distress, however, is 
suspect. Even at its height, the Industrial Revolution did not depend upon large firms 
with specialized assets dedicated exclusively to them. In the next section, we illustrate 
this point by focusing on the iconic firm of the Industrial Revolution—the Lancaster tex-
tile mill. 
B.  Ermen & Engels and Going-Concern Value 
Lancaster’s textile mills dominated England’s economy in the nineteenth century.35 
For the first time, cloth became readily available. Through its export, England amassed 
wealth on a scale never seen before. The average mill employed 400 workers.36 Machin-
ery was organized around a central steam engine. Gears and belts extending from it 
powered the spindles and accidents were common.37 By 1835, a quarter of a million peo-
ple worked in the cotton industry.38 Ermen & Engels is a representative example of these 
firms. Indeed, it is perhaps the iconic firm of the Industrial Revolution.39 Formed in 1838, 
Ermen & Engels made sewing thread in a large four-story factory.40 Its “Diamond 
                                                 
32. See DAVID H. BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS: BUILDING THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 198 (1999). 
33.  See id. at 102. 
34. See Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in 
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 101-10 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983). 
35. The industry also gave rise to Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864). With its two ships Peer-
less, the case remains a staple of first-year contracts. 
36. P.L. COTTRELL, INDUSTRIAL FINANCE 1830-1914, at 23 (1980). 
37. See FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 185-86 (W.O. Henderson 
& W.H. Chaloner eds. & trans., 1958) (1845). 
38. See J.R.T. HUGHES, FLUCTUATIONS IN TRADE, INDUSTRY AND FINANCE: A STUDY OF BRITISH ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1850-1860, at 98 (1960). 
39. The junior partner at Ermen & Engels actively wrote about social conditions in England and in 
Europe, and his perspective on markets and firms, formed while working at Ermen & Engels, became well 
known. For a representative example of his views, see KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST 
MANIFESTO (1848). For a discussion locating Engels with the Lancaster cotton industry in economics, see 
George R. Boyer, The Historical Background of the Communist Manifesto, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 151. 
40. 1 W.O. HENDERSON, THE LIFE OF FRIEDRICH ENGELS 200, 216 (1976). 
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 Thread” was sold with a distinctive logo of three red towers.41 
Ermen & Engels, like other mills, brought with it a large measure of human misery. 
As one of the managers of Ermen & Engels observed: 
The atmosphere in the factories is generally both damp and warm . . . . Even if 
the ventilation of the factory is very good, the air is still foul, stuffy, and deficient 
in oxygen. It is polluted with dust and the smell of stale machine oil, with which 
the floor is generally impregnated.42 
Until the 1840s, the average work week was seventy-six hours.43 Half of the workers 
were children who spent most of their waking lives tying pieces of broken thread to-
gether surrounded by pulleys, belts and whirring machinery.44 
Ermen & Engels merged with a number of other cotton spinning firms at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and with several others again at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury. 45 Now operating under the name Coats PLC, the company controls a large part of 
the world’s market for sewing thread and has offices throughout Europe and North 
America, as well as in China and Vietnam.46 
Many textile firms, however, did not enjoy the same success. Many were shut 
down.47 It might seem that these factories were much like railroads and that the world 
would have been a better place if England had had a law of corporate reorganizations at 
the time.48 The factory itself operated as a unit, and if the firm shut its doors, all the as-
sets would lie idle and the workers would lose their jobs. If fights among investors shut 
the firm down, the value of the firm as a going concern would be lost. 
But appearances are deceiving. Even though they employed hundreds, their capital 
requirements of firms in the textile business were much, much smaller than those of a 
                                                 
41. See id. at 196, 200. 
42. See ENGELS, supra note 37, at 174-75. 
43. See Joel Mokyr, Editor’s Introduction: The New Economic History and the Industrial Revolution, in THE 
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1, 94 (Joel Mokyr ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
44. See ENGELS, supra note 37, at 158-59. 
45. See HENDERSON, supra note 40, at 230; MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, COMPETITION COMMIS-
SION (UNITED KINGDOM), COATS VIYELLA PLC AND TOOTAL GROUP PLC: A REPORT ON THE MERGER SITUATIONS 23 
(1989), available at  
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/fulltext/260c1.pdf . 
46. See Coats PLC list of worldwide offices, at  
http://www.coats.com/80256C240031E2B6/vWeb/wpSPAR5D6JY4 (last visited Nov. 1 2002). The firm’s jun-
ior partner did not expect market economies, let alone his own firm, to last nearly so long. See HENDERSON, 
supra note 40, at 200. 
47. See COTTRELL, supra note 36, at 35 (“[L]ongevity was the exception rather than the rule during the 
industrial revolution.”). 
48. England’s first law allowing for the bankruptcy of firms as opposed to individuals was passed in 
1844. This law focused on liquidating as opposed to reorganizing the firm. See V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTO-
RIAN INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 222-23 (1995). 
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 railroad.49 The partners at Ermen & Engels used their own assets for the £50,000 needed 
to build and equip a factory that employed 800 people.50 Many firms began on a smaller 
scale and used the revenue generated from operating profits to expand.51 But the total 
amount of capital required was in any event within the reach of individual entrepre-
neurs. 
Moreover, the machinery used to spin cotton was not dedicated to a particular 
physical plant, nor were the machines in any plant interdependent. Even when a factory 
added more sophisticated equipment, it did not need to acquire entirely new machinery. 
One could, for example, convert a partially hand-powered spinner into one that was 
fully steam-powered by replacing the headstock, at a cost of only a fifth of a new one.52 
By the time of large firms employing hundreds of workers, the equipment that was 
needed to spin thread became standardized and could be added incrementally at low 
cost. The value that textile mills had as a going concern did not come from the way in 
which its assets were dedicated to the firm. What assets existed could be readily repli-
cated. A mill could burn to the ground and it could be readily rebuilt.53  
These attributes of the cotton mill share much in common with today’s industry. The 
hard assets of modern businesses tend to be even less dedicated to a particular firm than 
those of these cotton mills. Retailers rent space in a shopping center. Manufacturers lease 
space in an industrial park. Because power sources are contained within machines, fac-
tories no longer have to be organized around a central source. Modern building materi-
als—particularly reinforced concrete—make workspace flexible.54 A factory can be read-
ily transformed to make the same product differently or another product altogether. Just 
as the machines used for making thread became standardized, so too has the equipment 
used across a broad range of our economy.55 Retailers can acquire standardized shelving, 
cash registers, and furniture. 
Moreover, an increasingly service-based and information-based economy requires 
                                                 
49. See, e.g., Sidney Pollard, Fixed Capital in the Industrial Revolution in Britain, 24 J. ECON. HIST. 299, 314 
(1964) (“In the industrialization process, the pressure for capital stems to a very large extent indeed from the 
needs of public utilities, rather than from the factories or the mines.”). 
50. See HENDERSON, supra note 40, at 216. 
51. See COTTRELL, supra note 36, at 23 (“Cotton firms expanded mainly by the retention of profits. . . .”). 
52. G.N. VON TUNZELMANN, STEAM POWER AND BRITISH INDUSTRIALIZATION TO 1860, at 191 (1978). 
53. For example, the fire that destroyed Ermen & Engels’ Bencliffe Mill in 1871 had little impact on the 
firm. With the insurance policies that covered the hard assets, the firm was able to consolidate its produc-
tion, build a new mill, and continue to flourish. See John Smethurst, Ermen and Engels, MARX MEMORIAL LIBR. 
Q. BULL. (July-Sept. 1966). 
54. See ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE 104-05 (1986). 
55. This development has been underway for a long time. It had already begun in the automobile in-
dustry in the 1920s, when General Motors shifted from using custom-built machine tools that could perform 
only one operation to general-purpose machine tools. See DAVID A HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
TO MASS PRODUCTION 1800-1932: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 
263-301 (1984) (discussing similar developments at Ford Motor Co. factory); William S. Knudsen, “For Eco-
nomical Transportation”: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production, INDUS. MGMT., 
Aug. 1927, at 65-68. 
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 less in the way of hard assets. The law firm leases its space and may have no hard assets 
beyond office furniture and personal computers. The high-tech startup may have these 
same assets and no others. Even many of the firms that rely the most on large capital as-
sets, such as airlines, are more like thread-makers than railroads. The capital assets of an 
airline are readily bought, sold, or leased. Individual airplanes can be added to the fleet 
or taken away as demand changes. The Boeing 747s owned by TWA on one day can be 
easily reconfigured and run by American Airlines the next.56 
C.  Intangible Firm-Specific Assets and Going-Concern Value 
Firms also have intangible assets. Intellectual property accounted for the success en-
joyed by Ermen & Engels’ Diamond Thread. Godfrey Ermen developed a number of 
patents for cotton processing, including a particularly valuable one for polishing cotton 
thread.57 Intellectual property is an even more important part of modern firms. Such as-
sets, however, are not necessarily locked inside a particular firm. Godfrey Ermen made 
his fortune, not only from the operating profits of his firm, but also from the royalties he 
collected from other thread makers who used his technology.58 They produced the same 
commodity using the similar machinery and the same pool of workers. 
Intangible assets can be firm-specific. The textile mills varied in their ability to use 
the machinery and the workers effectively. This know-how is, of course, an asset of the 
firm, but the firms that possessed this knowledge were the ones that flourished. The 
firms that failed were typically those that were young59 and hence lacked exactly this 
asset. Few textile firms had any long-term debt.60 Any inability to make ends meet re-
sulted not from an inability to service debt but rather from an inability to produce reve-
nue that exceeded its ongoing operating costs. In these circumstances, financial distress 
was synonymous with economic distress. 
In an industry where assets are fungible, what creates value in a firm is the ability to 
use assets better than one’s competitors. John Rockefeller grew rich in part because he 
was able to cut small costs at many points in the production process. Every Standard Oil 
refinery sealed its five-gallon kerosene tin cans with thirty-nine drops of solder. Why 
thirty-nine? Some cans leaked when only thirty-eight drops were used, but forty drops 
were wasteful.61 Henry Ford’s Model T began as a mid-priced car that relied on exotic 
                                                 
56. In what has become a conventional use of Chapter 11, TWA entered bankruptcy last year solely for 
the purpose of selling its assets to American Airlines. See Carey, supra note 1. 
57. See HENDERSON, supra note 40, at 200. 
58. See id. 
59. See COTTRELL, supra note 36, at 35 (“[L]ongevity was the exception rather than the rule during the 
industrial revolution. . . . The crucial factor was whether a firm could survive its first four or five 
years. . . .”). 
60. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 49, at 308 (“[B]anks provided little long-term capital because little long-
term capital was demanded.”). 
61. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: A LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 180 (1998). 
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 alloys like vanadium.62 It became cheap only because Henry Ford and the team he as-
sembled discovered tens of thousands of small ways to reduce its cost and produce it in 
volume.63 
Bankruptcy law, by its nature, does not see those firms that succeed. Ermen & Engels 
never needed a law of corporate reorganization to protect its blend of assets and ability. 
The question for us is not how much value is locked inside the firms that flourish, but 
how much is locked up in firms that fail. The textile mills that failed may have failed 
precisely because their know-how was second-rate. 
Our economy today may have even fewer distressed firms that possess valuable 
know-how. The know-how that Ermen, Rockefeller, and Ford possessed was, to a large 
extent, scalable. Godfrey Ermen ran not one mill, but several.64 The story repeats itself 
many times. An entrepreneur who thinks there is a better way to run a business—
perhaps only slightly better—bets everything on it. If the entrepreneur turns out to be 
right, enormous success awaits. In today’s economy, it can happen quickly. A single in-
dividual believes that people will spend serious money on espresso and cappuccino that 
is properly made and succeeds on a grand scale in less than a decade.65 Such entrepre-
neurs succeed because capital markets and modern information technology let them 
place their products in almost every market. In other words, someone with a slightly 
better way of doing things can easily leverage this advantage across the economy as a 
whole. 
A single business model can drive out others. McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and other na-
tional fast food chains occupy the niche the local coffee shop once enjoyed.66 Office De-
pot, Staples, and Office Max are displacing the local stationery store.67 Instead of an 
economy in which there are many small firms, each of which has developed its own way 
of doing things, we increasingly have uniform firms built on the same business model. 
Put differently, our economy rewards entrepreneurs who discover a successful business 
plan and learn how to replicate it. 
Borders began as a single store in Ann Arbor, Michigan and, as it grew, it displaced 
many stores that also had developed their own way of doing things.68 The firms that 
failed in Borders’ wake possessed intangible know-how. Every small bookstore has a 
                                                 
62. See LACEY, supra note 54, at 87. 
63. See id. at 106-09. 
64. See Smethurst, supra note 53, at 9-10. 
65. Starbucks sold its first cup of coffee in April 1984 and had only six stores in March 1987. By 1997, it 
had 1300 stores and 25,000 employees. See HOWARD SCHULTZ & DORI JONES YANG, POUR YOUR HEART INTO IT: 
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66. National chains now occupy more than 50% of the restaurant market. Shirley Leung, Food Fight: 
Local Restaurants Find Big Chains Eating Their Lunch, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at A1. 
67. See Jeff Bailey, Enterprise: Doing Battle with the Giants of Office Products, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at 
B4. We must be careful not to overstate the point. Office Depot, Staples, and Office Max currently enjoy less 
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Aug. 7, 2000, at 40, available in 2000 WL 11029772. 
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 process for acquiring new books, displaying them, and training a workforce to sell them. 
Know-how locked up in any individual bookstore, however, is not worth saving in a 
world in which another firm has an operating plan that is both better and scaleable. The 
small bookstore has a firm-specific know-how that will disappear, but this know-how is 
worthless in a competitive market when a competitor arrives whose know-how is better, 
even if it is only slightly better. 
The losers are not simply the small firms, but also the larger ones that have different 
business models. Crown Books developed expertise in selling a relatively small number 
of the most popular books at deep discounts. Although this concept proved initially suc-
cessful, it soon lost luster when competitors developed ways to both match this discount 
and offer a wider selection.69 Any expertise that even a large firm possesses becomes 
worthless when its business model fails. 
WalMart, the nation’s largest corporation, produces nothing. It developed a way of 
putting manufactured goods into consumer hands at a cost lower than its competitors. 
To be sure, WalMart made substantial investments in infrastructure to give it these ad-
vantages. For example, WalMart’s ability to monitor sales and ensure a continuous sup-
ply of inventory turns on a proprietary computer system.70 But such know-how has 
value only to the extent that it gives WalMart an edge over its rivals. WalMart did not 
fail; Kmart did.71 Indeed, it was Kmart’s failure to put a similar system in place that con-
tributed to its downfall.72 
Hard assets are, of course, still dedicated to a particular enterprise. A brewery, a 
steel foundry, a power plant, a coal mine, and an oil refinery have assets whose highest 
and best use is to brew beer, smelt iron, generate power, extract coal, and produce pet-
rochemicals at that location. These assets are dedicated to a specific purpose and cannot 
be easily transferred to either another use or another location. Firms constructed around 
such assets, however, have decreased in economic importance. 
Railroads, steel manufacturers, and oil refineries dominated the economy in the first 
part of the twentieth century. The Pennsylvania Railroad, the New York Central, and a 
half dozen others each had more assets than any firm apart from U.S. Steel and Standard 
Oil.73 Most workers were engaged in manufacturing.74 Microsoft and WalMart did not 
                                                 
69. See id. 
70. VANCE H. TRIMBLE, SAM WALTON: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S RICHEST MAN 194 (1990). 
71. Kmart’s Chapter 11 filing is one of the few that most resembles the traditional reorganization in 
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 exist. Our economy has undergone a continuous transformation since then, and the pace 
is accelerating. Intangible assets now make up almost half of the value of nonfinancial 
firms in this country.75 The number of people working in the service industries has more 
than doubled over the last twenty years.76 More than twice as many people today work 
in service industries as in manufacturing.77 The hard assets in the service industries con-
sist of general office space, desks, chairs, and word processors. 
Moreover, many investments in specialized hard assets are made after the business 
plan has proved successful and are small relative to the revenues that the business al-
ready realizes. Henry Ford established the moving assembly line only after the Model T 
had been in production for five years.78 The factory that produced annual revenues of 
$89 million cost only $6.4 million.79 Even the annual cost to Ford of the plan to pay 
workers $5 a day ($10 million) swamped these costs.80 WalMart’s large investment in its 
inventory system came only after its business plan had proved successful. Anheiser-
Busch constructed new breweries only as demand for its beer grew.81 Firms that make 
large investments in enterprise-specific assets tend not to be the firms that fail. Indeed, 
they commonly lead to the failure of other firms. As Ford profited from the Model T, 
others withered. Fifty years ago, small cities would have several breweries. These have 
disappeared.82 
                                                                                                                                     
74. See Victor R. Fuchs, The Growing Importance of the Service Industries, 38 J. BUS. 344, 344 (1965). 
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 Even when firms make large investments in hard assets and face financial distress, 
there is still nothing to reorganize if what fails is the basic business plan. Webvan was an 
audacious attempt to revolutionize the way in which people bought groceries. A few 
clicks of the mouse, and the selected groceries would arrive at your doorstep at the time 
of your choosing. To implement this concept, Webvan created a large infrastructure de-
signed to assemble produce and other perishables in large warehouses and distribute 
them across a large geographic region.83 Much of the machinery in the warehouse was 
custom designed to ensure that groceries moved quickly from shelves to waiting vans 
for delivery. 
Webvan’s business plan did not work. Others might.84 Webvan had substantial oper-
ating costs over and above its massive firm-specific investments. It could not generate a 
positive cash flow. Once the business plan failed, the assets specifically built to distrib-
ute groceries in this fashion no longer had any value. The assets were dedicated to an 
enterprise that was not itself viable. Chapter 11 could do nothing to change this, and 
hence Webvan’s Chapter 11 consisted entirely of bringing about an orderly liquidation 
of the assets. 
Iridium provides another example.85 One of the largest business failures in history, 
Iridium built a five billion dollar network of satellites in low-earth orbit.86 The business 
plan was based on the idea that this network could capture one percent of the world 
market for cell phones. The idea was that at least this many users of cell phones needed 
to be able to use a phone that would call any other phone in the world from anywhere in 
the world, and would pay a hefty premium for such a service. Like Webvan, the busi-
ness idea required a large investment in dedicated assets with a long development time. 
By the time the network came into operation, however, cell-phone technology with a 
shorter development cycle and less dependence on large upfront enterprise-specific in-
vestment had outstripped it in both convenience and costs. Few people were far enough 
away from ordinary phone service that they wanted to spend several dollars a minute 
for a brick-sized Iridium phone that could be used only outdoors.87 
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 Once Iridium’s business plan failed, its dedicated assets had little value. The satel-
lites were almost burned up in the atmosphere because even the expense of maintaining 
them in orbit was high relative to the revenues they could bring.88 Iridium was a firm 
built entirely of assets that had no use in any other configuration. But when it failed, this 
point was irrelevant.89 
In short, many assets work equally as well in one firm as another. Other assets that 
are tailored to a specific firm may not represent a source of value but the source of fail-
ure. Our point here is a cautionary one. One can point to neither the size of a firm alone 
nor the existence of firm-specific assets to conclude that corporation reorganization law 
has an important role to play in our modern economy. In the next Part, we show that 
even large firms with dedicated assets that produce a positive value cannot, standing 
alone, animate a robust law of corporate reorganizations. 
III. SPECIALIZED ASSETS AND THE FIRM-MARKET BOUNDARY 
This Part of the Article focuses upon economic enterprises that do indeed depend on 
specialized assets. Here again we make two basic points. First, the need for a law of cor-
porate reorganizations as traditionally conceived depends crucially upon specialized 
assets that need to reside in a particular firm. The cost of alternatives to production inside 
a particular firm puts a ceiling on the going-concern surplus any given firm possesses. 
The boundary between transactions inside the firm and outside in the market is perme-
able even in the industries most dependent upon hard, fixed assets. 
We then focus upon what may be the most important specialized assets in our econ-
omy: Teams of individuals that have, over time, developed specialized expertise that 
cannot be transplanted wholesale to others. Even here, however, the problem of keeping 
a team intact is different from the problem of preserving a particular firm. Not all of the 
workers in a firm are part of the team that gives the enterprise value and not all of the 
members of the team need work for the firm. While maintaining a successful team may 
be a challenge, it is not one to which bankruptcy law is a primary response. To illustrate 
both ideas, we use examples drawn from the automobile industry. 
A.  Dedicated Assets and the Early History of Automobile Manufacturing 
Many entrepreneurs started automobile companies at the start of the twentieth cen-
tury. Over 500 car companies were formed in this country between 1900 and 1908.90 The 
backers of the first car makers faced the familiar challenge of bringing a prototype into 
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 production. The designer of their car was often someone who possessed great engineer-
ing skills, but who knew nothing about putting the car into production. The experience 
of the backers of the Detroit Automobile Company captures the basic problem. In 1899, 
investors together pooled together $150,000—perhaps the largest amount yet assembled 
behind a car company.91 They put their trust in an engineer whose prototype was per-
haps the best car made up to that time. But the engineer, rather than trying to put the 
prototype into production, spent the firm’s capital designing a wholly different kind of 
vehicle—a delivery truck.92 
Less than a year later, neither had been brought to market, and the designer com-
plained he was undervalued. The firm closed, but the same group backed this designer 
again some months later. When he again showed an inability to produce the car he de-
signed, his backers brought in the head of Detroit’s finest machine shop as a consultant. 
A short while later, they made the consultant their chief executive officer and threw out 
the designer.93 The new CEO was Henry Leland. 
Henry Leland was born in Vermont, trained as a mechanic, and worked at Colt Re-
volver and other arms factories. He excelled at making finely machined and inter-
changeable parts. After moving to Detroit, he began to produce internal combustion en-
gines. Once put in charged of the company, Leland took the design that his predecessor 
had made, substituted a motor of his own design, and proceeded to manufacture the 
car.94 
The key to the production of automobiles came from milling each metal part pre-
cisely. Assembly of the car no longer required trained mechanics to get the pieces to 
work together. Leland stunned automobile builders in England when he disassembled 
three of his cars, mixed the parts together and then reassembled them. It was no accident 
that one of the first leaders in the automobile industry began in the arms industry, the 
place where the production of machines with interchangeable parts began. Leland’s ex-
pertise—in particular his ability to organize the production and assembly of finely 
milled metal components—made the company successful. 
But Leland’s initial contributions to the firm came in his capacity as an outside con-
sultant. Indeed, at the time he started this work, he was also making motors for Ransom 
Olds, a car already in quantity production.95 The need for Leland’s expertise did not nec-
essarily require that he be an employee as opposed to an outside consultant. Nor did his 
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 ability to manufacture precision parts for one firm preclude him from making different 
parts for another firm. 
The first automobile makers in fact were little more than designers who assembled 
components acquired from others.96 For example, the designer Leland displaced 
founded yet another firm after being shown the door. This time he farmed out most of 
the manufacturing. The C.R. Wilson Carriage Company made the car’s wooden body 
shells and leather upholstery. The Prudden Company produced the wheels, and for the 
mechanical components, he turned to John F. and Horace E. Dodge, two young brothers 
who made mechanical components for steam engines, bicycles, and firearms. Like 
Leland, they had already produced parts for Ransom Olds. The firm spent $384 on com-
ponents for each car and only twenty dollars on assembling them.97 
The early days of the automobile industry shows how highly engineered and com-
plicated products made to fine tolerances can be produced through contracts in the mar-
ket place as well as inside a firm. This ability to conduct business through contracts as 
easily as inside a firm is increasingly common today. As communication costs, transpor-
tation costs, and contracting costs drop, it has become easier to produce goods without 
creating a traditional firm. Two entrepreneurs began the Boston Brewing Company. 
They developed their own recipe and proprietary yeast strains and then contracted out 
the brewing of Sam Adams beer to others. A team of brewmasters ensures that each con-
tractor conforms to company standards. For many years its only brewery was a small 
one used to develop and test recipes.98 
By contracting in the marketplace, business enterprises can flourish without owning 
any hard assets dedicated to the task at hand. Monorail Corporation sells computers but 
owns nothing. It leases an office building, and has contracts with computer manufac-
tures. When it gets an order, it sends the order to the appropriate manufacturer. FedEx 
delivers the finished computer to the customer.99 An entrepreneur who wants to bring a 
new shoe to market today hires a designer, finds an off-shore manufacturer, and negoti-
ates a deal with distributors without investing in any hard assets or indeed ever leaving 
her desk. The rise of business-to-business electronic commerce makes it easier to transact 
in the marketplace and hence makes asset-specialization inside the firm less important. 
Creating such a network of contracts can be costly. If the beer, the shoe, or the com-
puter fails in the marketplace, the resources dedicated to producing it will become 
worthless and the entrepreneurs who supported the venture will lose a lot of money. 
But the need to make product-specific investments does not require a commitment to 
keeping any particular firm in existence or indeed any firm at all. Even if the product a 
firm makes is valuable, the firm itself may have no value as a going concern. 
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 What applies to hard assets applies to an even greater extent to intangible assets. 
Products may have intangible good will associated with them, but nothing requires that 
a particular entity survive in order for such assets to survive. For example, when the 
company that made Ballantine beer failed, the name and the distribution network were 
sold to Falstaff.100 The beer continues to be sold, even though the brewery itself was 
closed a quarter of a century ago.101 
Return again to the designer who oversaw the demise of the Detroit Motor Company 
and its successor. He persuaded a handful of investors to back him again and finally 
succeeded. He designed the car, but relied upon others to produce the components. His 
firm only assembled the different parts. This designer continued to spend much of his 
time tinkering and was not satisfied until, after six years, he reached his twentieth de-
sign.102 As at other car firms of the period, each model (not all of which were produced 
and marketed) was named after successive letters of the alphabet—Model A, Model B, 
and so forth. Hence, Henry Ford called this car the Model T. 
The Model T represented a clean break from vehicles based on carriages designed to 
be pulled by horses, and relied instead on a light-weight frame of the steel alloy vana-
dium. The engine was cast from a single block. Another innovation was a lightweight 
steel casing that enclosed the transmission, axles, and other workings of the car. Keim 
Mills, a machine-shop in Buffalo, developed this technology and convinced Ford to try it 
on his new model.103 
Keim Mills’ contributions to the design and the production of the Model T did not 
depend in any way on its assets or its workers being part of the Ford Motor Company. 
Keim Mills remained an independent entity for several years, and then it became a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company. Some time later, workers at Keim 
Mills were foolish enough to think that they were essential to the production of the 
Model T and went on strike. Within three days, Henry Ford shut down the plant, and 
moved both the stamping presses and the key managers to Detroit.104 The ownership of 
these machines and the loyalty of those in charge had value, but neither depended upon 
Keim Mills existing as a going concern. 
Firms that supply components to another manufacturer are commonplace because 
they rarely have hold-up power, and what power exists can typically be restrained 
through contract. A supplier may use stamping presses with custom dies, but the down-
stream supplier can own the machine and then lease it to the supplier.105 Modern auto-
mobiles made in this country today contain over 10,000 parts and more than a third of 
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 those still come from outside suppliers.106 The trend today in the car industry is toward 
car companies owning fewer assets and relying increasingly on contracts with suppli-
ers.107 The aircraft industry tells a similar story. The engine of the modern jetliner ac-
counts for a large part of its value, and aircraft makers rely on others to supply it.108 Air-
bus is a consortium of many manufactures, and for some models forty percent of the 
components are made by manufacturers in the United States.109 
B.  Firm-Specific Human Capital, Teams, and Going-Concern Value 
Even if the value of a firm resides largely in the team of key employees who work 
there, little may be lost if the firm disappears.110 As the example of Keim Mills illustrates, 
the team can continue to work together at one or more others. Indeed, there are parts of 
the economy—such as the motion picture industry—in which firms often come into be-
ing for a single project.111 The technicians and support staff are under short-term con-
tract.112 Nevertheless, we see a director and the same group of actors, producers, and 
cinematographers stay together for decades.113 It makes no difference to the workers that 
they are working for a different entity or that the hard assets that they are using (cam-
eras, lights, and so forth) are different from the ones they used in the last project. Some 
of the projects make money; many do not.114 Failure of one film to turn a profit may 
make it harder for the producer to induce investors to fund the next film. But the entity 
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 that created the film will disappear regardless of whether the film succeeds or fails. 
Writing the contracts to ensure that teams remain entails costs, but these costs are 
what we must squarely focus upon. It has nothing to do with whether a particular firm 
continues as a discrete legal entity. The synergy of the team makes it valuable, but the 
value may be independent of any firm. As long as the team can be reassembled easily, 
the firm for which it works at any moment has little value in its own right. Corporations 
are entities that, in theory, last forever, but this legal principle tells us nothing about 
whether the firm is worth keeping intact.115 
The willingness of the key personnel at Keim Mills to move to Detroit contributed in 
large measure to the ultimate success of the Model T.116 The most important contribu-
tions of the Keim Mills team came from its skill in organizing automobile production, 
not from its expertise with respect to stamping metal parts or any other specialized skill. 
John Lee created the incentive compensation system that allowed Henry Ford to boast 
that he paid his workers five dollars a day.117 William S. Knudsen decentralized auto-
mobile assembly at Ford. He established assembly plants all across the country and re-
duced the cost of a Model T by reducing transportation costs.118 After leaving Ford, 
Knudsen brought the same ideas to General Motors. His reconfiguration of the Chevro-
let Division required him to change where one of its principal suppliers (Fisher Body) 
ran its operations and how it conducted them. Just as Ford had relocated Keim Mills’ 
metal stamping operations and folded them into his firm, Knudsen folded Fisher Body 
into General Motors.119 
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 Human capital today is increasingly industry-specific, rather than firm-specific. Even 
in the most high-tech sector of the economy, the place where the skills of the workers 
tend to loom largest, we see high levels of worker mobility.120 Worker mobility again has 
increased over the last several decades, and workers are now more mobile because the 
skills they acquire at one firm are readily transferable to another. 
Each computer programmer focuses on only a specific part of a program. That pro-
grammer does not need to know much about any other part of the program, only the 
task that her portion of the program contributes and the way to access the other portions 
of the program her part needs to function. As long as a software writer knows how to 
invoke other parts of the program, she does not need to know much about anything else. 
As a result, a software writer can move among different projects at her own firm or a 
new one relatively easily. We can see the same force at work across the entire service 
sector. Lawyers develop highly specialized practices, but they can move from one firm 
to another. Accountants can audit books as easily at KPMG as at Ernst & Young. A sur-
geon develops skill in doing one type of operation, but she can perform that operation at 
many different hospitals. 
The economic value of a firm may turn not so much on the discrete contribution of 
any individual, but rather on the way in which workers form an effective team.121 The 
team Ford acquired from Keim Mills is one such example. Teams possess value over and 
above the value that each worker brings to the enterprise. The great investment banks 
have a complete turnover of their top employees every twenty years, but the firm’s 
value remains locked inside the team that is in place. Cravath remains one of the world’s 
finest law firms with a culture that has been sustained for more than a century. From the 
animators at Walt Disney in the 1940s to the engineers at NASA in the 1960s to the soft-
ware writers at Microsoft in the 1990s, one can identify teams across a large range of ac-
tivities. The histories of most successful enterprises tell of the group of individuals cru-
cial to their successes. Often these individuals will have had little success in earlier or 
later ventures with other people. Being a successful team-builder is one of the most im-
portant skills of an effective manager. 
Preserving the value of a team is often a challenge that a firm faces when it is in eco-
nomic distress. The possibility of financial collapse can lead talented employees to look 
for another employer. When turn-around firms are brought in to run a firm that is in fi-
nancial distress, one of the first challenges is discovering the key people who run the 
technology or who make the sales. Rarely do they discover managers with great strate-
gic vision or financial acumen, but teams who effectively run the operation do exist. In 
the first few days of a large Chapter 11, one of the first issues before the judge is often 
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 the approval of a set of contracts designed to keep the key employees on board. The 
judge faces the task of distinguishing between self-dealing on the one hand and preserv-
ing a valuable asset of the firm on the other.122 
Even with respect to teams, however, one must be careful to distinguish the team 
from the firm. The organizational form and the team are independent of one another. 
The Keim Mills team contributed to the success of the Model T over many years, both 
when they worked for Keim and when they worked for Ford. Their identity as a team 
was independent of the legal entity that employed them and independent of that entity’s 
relationship to the Model T. 
The traditional law firm was a partnership of individuals that dissolved and re-
formed whenever someone entered or left the partnership. A law firm might also be a 
partnership of professional corporations. Such tax-driven organizational forms have lit-
tle effect on the way in which the team works. Nor is the team co-extensive with the en-
terprise itself. A law firm often possesses a number of different practice groups. Each 
practice group may work independently of the others and each can leave the firm as a 
unit and join another firm. 
Indeed, in firms where the future revenue is simply the product of the work of the 
team, there is no magic to any particular firm. The ownership interests in the firm are 
nothing more than a claim on the future cash that the firm produces. There are no hard 
assets. Such firms often write contracts to ensure that a single individual member does 
not leave the firm and attempt to take clients with him to another firm. But the entire 
group can often move to a different organization. Put differently, teams have value, but 
their value need not be tied to any particular firm. 
To be sure, we do see particular firms that exist for an extended period of time even 
though, at first glance, there is nothing to tie this group of workers to this firm. These 
firms owe their existence to providing a focal point for maintaining the team. Teams do 
not depend upon each member remaining. Indeed, successful teams are self-replicating. 
The string section of the Philadelphia Orchestra still possesses the distinctive sound that 
Leopold Stokowski created when he became its conductor in 1912.123 Teams are formed 
with the idea of turnover in mind. Members come and go. Losing everyone on a team is 
much, much more than ten times the loss of ten percent of the team. When a team is suc-
cessful, staying in a particular firm provides a convenient location for the bargaining 
necessary to maintain the enterprise. Each team member lacks comparable opportunities 
elsewhere, and those who hold out stand to lose if they fail to make a deal. The cost of 
keeping a team together turns on legal rules that are independent of those of the law of 
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 corporate reorganizations, such as the law governing restrictive covenants and cove-
nants not to compete.124 
But these are successful firms. They continue to exist only because they are success-
ful. If they were not successful there would be no reason to remain with this particular 
firm. To link the need to preserve a team with preserving a particular firm that is in fi-
nancial distress, one needs to posit that the firm has assets that the team needs in order 
to flourish. One can readily identify firms where the firm has an asset that the team 
needs. Microsoft software writers need access to the Windows code; Disney animators 
needed the permission to render Mickey Mouse. A sales force may have value only if it 
is able to sell the firm’s branded product or serve its client base. A software producer 
needs its key technology people to protect the value of its intellectual property. A robust 
law of corporate reorganizations must focus on firms that have valuable teams yet face 
financial distress. 
In sum, the place in our economy where synergies most likely matter—teams of in-
dividuals focused on the same enterprise—is also a place where oftentimes little value is 
locked up inside and conditioned on the continuing existence in a particular firm. For a 
particular firm to be an integral part of the value of the team, it has contribute unique 
assets to the mix. In the next Part, however, we show that even in such circumstances, 
the law of corporate reorganizations has little relevance. As we shall see, the ability of 
investors to contract among themselves and the presence of liquid markets for going-
concerns undercut the need for a law of corporate reorganizations still further. 
IV. CONTROL RIGHTS, GOING-CONCERN SALES, AND THE  
NATURE OF THE FIRM 
The law of corporate reorganizations requires a number of conditions to be present 
at the same time. In the last two Parts, we focused on two of these. There must be assets 
dedicated to a particular economic activity, and, for some reason, these assets must be 
together in a firm. In Part IV, we explore two more conditions. A viable firm requires 
Chapter 11 only if those who control it cannot collectively make coherent decisions out-
side the bankruptcy forum. For the traditional account of corporate reorganizations to 
make sense, there must be firms in which those who own it are unable to write effective 
investment contracts. 
Even if control rights are not allocated coherently, there is still no need for a collec-
tive forum that decides the fate of the firm if the firm can be sold in the marketplace as a 
going concern. The rise of such markets further undercuts the need for a traditional law 
of corporate reorganization. Indeed, the ability of modern bankruptcy judges to take ad-
vantage of these markets explains many of the Chapter 11 filings in recent years. 
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 A.  The Primacy of Control Rights 
A law of corporate reorganizations is needed only when the investors cannot make 
sensible decisions when the firm encounters trouble. When control rights are allocated 
coherently, no legal intervention is needed to ensure that decisions about the firm’s fu-
ture are made sensibly. Most large firms now allocate control rights among investors in 
a way that ensures coherent decisionmaking throughout the firm’s life cycle.125 Just as 
modern cars are designed to take account of the possibility that they might crash, mod-
ern capital structures are designed with the possibility of financial distress in mind. For 
most firms, there is a coherent contract among investors that keeps financial distress 
from destroying the firm.126 As the cost of contracting over control rights—the rights to 
deploy a firm’s assets—continues to fall, we should expect the risk of costly internecine 
fights among investors to matter even less. In other words, the ability of investors to 
contract among each other over the control of a firm’s assets further limits the value of a 
law that ensures that a firm’s assets remain together. 
Financial distress is an artifact of the capital structure the investors in a firm select. 
When a firm has a sole owner (as Ford essentially did for its first 50 years), there is no 
need for bankruptcy. Barring tort claims or other misadventures, the entrepreneur de-
cides on her own whether to close the doors if there are too few buyers of its goods or 
services. Coherent decisionmaking can also take place even when a firm has multiple 
owners. Control rights are allocated among investors in any given enterprise through 
various investment contracts. If these rights are allocated sensibly, the shutdown deci-
sion will reside in the hands of those with the best information and the appropriate in-
centives to exercise it correctly.127 If the transaction costs associated with such contract-
ing are low enough, we once again have no need for a law of corporate reorganizations 
as traditionally understood. 
Cash-flow rights parcel financial claims among various investors. As such, they do 
not affect or imperil going-concern surplus. They simply specify how the returns from 
an enterprise should be distributed. Control rights are another matter. Control rights 
allocate decision-making authority over the firm’s assets and by their nature are more 
complex than cash-flow rights. Cash is a single metric; control is not. Control is the abil-
ity to make decisions regarding the deployment of assets, including human capital. 
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 These include decisions both large and small. They can range from the decision to merge 
with another firm, stop producing a current product, change suppliers and so on. These 
rights are spread among various actors. 
Control rights are state contingent. When things are going well, control rights tend 
to be exercised by those inside the firm. The day-to-day decisions are made by the firm’s 
managers and those to whom they delegate responsibility. The board of directors has the 
authority to remove control rights from one set of managers and give them to another. 
The board can be replaced by the shareholders. 
When things are going poorly, however, control rights can shift to parties not tradi-
tionally viewed as inside the firm. Some of these shifts are intentional. A debt contract 
may give a lender the right to put a person on the board of directors in the case of finan-
cial distress. A board of directors can decide to remove the extant managers and bring in 
a turnaround firm. The traditional conception of corporate reorganizations starts with 
the belief that when a firm is in distress control rights will not be vested in the hands of 
someone who exercises them sensibly. Once the firm defaults on one or more loan cove-
nants, creditors acquire control rights and may have the power to shut the firm down. It 
is the fear of the improper exercise of such power that lies at the heart of reorganization 
law. 
Again, the railroads are the paradigmatic case. As already noted,128 the capital struc-
tures of the great railroads were a mess and this, in addition to the specialized and firm-
specific nature of the firm’s assets, required a law of corporate reorganizations. There 
were thousands of bondholders, scattered across the world, with security interest in 
dozens of different pieces of the firm.129 These investors were incapable of speaking with 
a single voice, and it often was not clear how the railroad should be restructured. Which 
lines that should be kept, whether the same managers should be in charge, and what 
capital structure made sense were questions to which the answers were often unclear. 
No part of the contract between the firm and its investors provided a mechanism for ad-
dressing these questions. 
But the capital structures of the railroads were atypical for the firms of the time. As 
we saw in the previous Part, firms such as Ermen & Engels and Cadillac had only a 
handful of investors in their capital structures, and they effectively could speak with a 
single voice. The capital requirements of the railroads were on a scale that was never 
seen before and seen seldom since. This need drove the investment bankers to raise capi-
tal in the form of debt from thousands of individuals. Dozens of groups of creditors had 
the right to seize physically different assets of the road, including its bridges, its termi-
nals, and the rails themselves. When the firms failed to generate the expected revenues, 
some mechanism was needed to place control into the hands of someone who could 
make the hard decisions, and the equity receivership was the forum created for this task. 
The law of corporate reorganizations matters only when the capital structure of a 
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 firm fails to lodge control rights in the hands of someone who can exercise them compe-
tently. To be sure, there are times when the investment contracts fail to allocate control 
sensibly. Those with power may have incentives to exercise it inappropriately. The man-
ager whose personal wealth is tied up in the firm’s stock will have an incentive not to 
shut the firm down, even if the assets are worth more if sold piecemeal. The secured 
creditor who can only recover what it is owed has the incentive force an inefficient sale 
of its collateral when the proceeds of the sale will pay the creditor in full. If either is 
vested with control rights, bad decisions can be made. 
Yet how likely are investors to agree to contracts that misallocate power in this way? 
Railroads had primitive investment contracts. Initial investors had no idea what shape 
the railroad would take or even what other investors would participate in the enterprise. 
The best they could do was trust that J.P. Morgan and Robert Swaine would sort matters 
out for them if things turned out badly.130 But we have learned a lot in the last century. 
Investors are now better able to anticipate financial distress. When writing investment 
contracts, they know not to allow managers unfettered control when things go poorly. 
By the same account, junior investors know that senior creditors should not be able to 
act opportunistically when the firm is worth keeping intact. 
Many firms simply lack the sort of capital structure that make a law of corporate re-
organizations even relevant. Nearly a third of small businesses have no institutional 
debt.131 The enterprises whose future is most uncertain tend to be small businesses when 
they are just starting. Early in their life cycle, these firms rely largely on equity invest-
ments and loans from insiders. The assets are often leased. Hundreds of restaurants may 
open and close in a given year in a large metropolitan area, but only a handful ever end 
up in bankruptcy.132 
High-tech firms may have capital requirements that require outside investors, but 
they also have sophisticated contracts expressly designed to ensure that control rights lie 
in the appropriate hands.133 These start-ups have very little debt; moreover, those who 
extend debt do not look to the ability to grab collateral to ensure repayment.134 Most fi-
nancing comes from venture capital in the form of equity. But the venture capital con-
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 tracts specify when control shifts to the venture capitalists. The venture capitalist selects 
the management team and can change it when the firm fails to meet specified mile-
stones.135 
To see how contracts can allocate control rights coherently in a failing enterprise, 
consider the demise of Webvan.136 The assets of Webvan were dedicated to a grocery de-
livery business. The CEO was a successful businessman who enjoyed the confidence of 
the investors. If Webvan was going to succeed, it was with this CEO. The only question 
was the level of demand for Webvan’s services. The investors decided exactly how long 
they were going to give the CEO to ascertain whether or not there was sufficient de-
mand to suggest that Webvan may have a going concern surplus. Only when it became 
clear that there was no market niche to fill did Webvan file for bankruptcy. All the im-
portant decisions were made outside of bankruptcy. Webvan had exhausted all its op-
tions before it filed for Chapter 11. The Chapter 11 was instituted not to reorganize but 
to sell off the assets in an orderly fashion. From beginning to end, control of Webvan’s 
assets rested with those in the best position to make the strategic decisions. 
Much of the law of corporate reorganizations (and indeed corporate law generally) is 
premised upon the idea that contracts set out control rights over the assets of the firm in 
a way that is fixed and rigid. Under this view, legal processes and rules are needed be-
cause exogenous events create a mismatch between incentives of the individual inves-
tors that possess control rights and what is in the best interest of the firm as a whole. As 
Barry Adler has pointed out, however, control rights are typically defined dynami-
cally.137 They change as the firm’s fortunes change, typically in ways that ensure that 
such mismatches do not occur. 
Control rights are allocated through the corporate charter, the securities the firm is-
sues, and the debt contracts into which it enters. Legal rules themselves also grant con-
trol rights. Many of these are default rules investors change by agreement. Equity inves-
tors exercise control rights by voting their stock and by sitting on the board of directors. 
Holders of debt instruments exercise control through their power to declare defaults. 
The power to declare defaults can give them the de facto power to hire and fire the man-
agers and the ability to review decisions the managers make about how the assets are to 
be used. 
Those who exercise control rights can be incompetent. Part of the challenge is to de-
vise a robust mechanism to dislodge them at the right time. Incentives alone do not en-
sure a successful decision maker. Some managers are simply not up to snuff.138 Even the 
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 most carefully crafted compensation contract cannot turn every manager into Jack 
Welch.139 The trick is to allocate control rights in a way that ensures that the managers 
can stay when they perform well but are ousted when they do not. 
The configuration of control rights at a firm at any moment turns on both the nature 
of the business it is in and the economic conditions in which it finds itself. Consider, for 
example, a firm that makes fashions for teenagers. Because the clothes themselves are 
made overseas, the firm’s suppliers (or their intermediaries) are likely to insist on a 
standby letter of credit that insures they will be paid.140 To obtain such a letter, the firm 
will have to have a credit line with a bank. Apart from this credit line, however, the 
principal challenge facing the owners when designing the capital structure is to find the 
right CEO, to give that person the right set of incentives, and to put a governance struc-
ture in place that removes the CEO if necessary. 
While the investors can make judgments about the sort of person most likely to 
make these decisions well, they cannot know perfectly nor can they review decisions as 
the CEO makes them. Quite the contrary, to give any investors the ability to microman-
age the CEO’s fashion judgment invites disaster. The CEO is hired precisely because she 
is supposed to have a comparative advantage on this score over the investors. These in-
vestors need a capital structure that gives the CEO slack for a season or two, but still al-
lows the investors to dump her if she has not been successful. Apart from the credit line 
(which may never be drawn upon), the firm may consist largely of equity, but held by a 
relatively small number of investors who also sit on the board.141 
By contrast, consider a startup firm that is designing a new piece of software. The 
expertise to build and design the software resides with the entrepreneur who founds the 
firm. The only question for the outside investors is how long to continue to develop the 
product before giving up. Such a firm may also consist entirely of equity, but the inves-
tors will insist upon a contract that shifts control rights over the firm to them in bad 
states of the world.142 Moreover, when additional capital is required (either from the old 
investors or a new one), the equity interest of the owner-manager is diluted according to 
a fixed formula. This structure puts the liquidation decision in the hands of the venture 
capitalist, and the dilution mechanism allows the firm to continue to access capital mar-
kets as long as its venture is worth pursuing. 
For a mature firm with steady cash flows, investors might prefer a different ar-
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 rangement of control rights. The danger here is that those in charge will fail to focus on 
maximizing cash flow.143 The investors will put in place a capital structure that requires 
the people running this firm to distribute cash on a continual basis. They can do this by 
having the firm issue short-term debt that requires the managers to go to the market re-
peatedly.144 Alternatively, they may have the firm pay cash dividends to the stockhold-
ers.145 Finally, they can put substantial leverage in the company that requires the pay-
ment of periodic interest on the pain of default. Failure to live up to any of these obliga-
tions—the ability to turn over short-term debt, the payment of dividends or the default 
on long-term debt—can spell the beginning of the end for the current managers. 
 The primacy of control rights can explain what otherwise appear to be anomalous 
capital structures. Return, for example, to Iridium. The largest single shareholder was 
Motorola. It was also building all the equipment for the system and would run it once it 
was built. Iridium initially had no debt in its capital structure, and Motorola guaranteed 
the initial round of outside debt.146 The equityholders apart from Motorola were inves-
tors who would control ground stations for the system across the world. The revenues 
that Motorola and the others would enjoy would turn not on the value of their invest-
ment instruments, but also on how much business the firm did. During this period Irid-
ium was not so much a discrete firm as it was a joint venture among partners that each 
stood to gain were the venture to prove successful. Iridium, like a railroad, required a 
large up-front commitment of capital, but unlike the nineteenth-century railroad, the 
capital markets were sufficiently liquid to allow control rights to be coherently allocated 
at the outset.147 As Iridium’s financial troubles deepened, Iridium entered into an $800 
million credit facility with bank lenders who insisted a number of new covenants. These 
established quarterly milestones for both revenues and subscriber levels. Breach of these 
covenants would make the principal on the loans due and owing and effectively give 
control of the firm to the banks.148  
 Iridium is an unusual case, but the appearance of a secured credit facility that gives 
power to banks in the event the debtor’s fortunes fail to improve is increasingly the 
norm. In the typical case, there is a revolving credit facility put in place when financial 
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 distress appears on the horizon. The facility operates as follows. The lead lender receives 
all the accounts and releases cash to the debtor according to a prescribed formula. It can 
terminate the arrangement (and close down the firm as it will have no operating capital) 
in the event of default and a default can be declared when the lead lender finds that 
there are “reasonable grounds for insecurity.” With such a facility in place and the con-
trol that the lead lender has over cash collateral, a single entity can decide how to use the 
firm’s assets. It can monitor the firm’s cash flows closely. Its ability to declare a default 
allows it to insist that the firm hire a turnaround specialist who supplements or in some 
cases replaces the existing managers.149 
The revolving credit facility installed as the firm begins to have trouble making debt 
payments also gives the lender who runs it the ability to control the firm inside of Chap-
ter 11 as well as out. Most large firms that enter Chapter 11 lack enough free cash flow to 
operate without debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.150 The control that the lender has 
over cash collateral makes it hard to enter into a financing arrangement without its ex-
plicit blessing.151 Its blessing can be contingent upon many things, including a require-
ment that the firm be sold as a going concern within a fixed period of time.152 At other 
times, the lender may give the current managers one more chance to turn around the 
fortunes of the firm, but it may be time constrained. A sale of assets may not be required 
immediately, but the DIP lending agreement may require that the assets be sold if the 
firm is not cash flow positive in a relatively short time. In other words, it is the lender, 
and not the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy judge, that is deciding how long the 
managers will have to make a go of things. 
These revolving credit facilities and the practical control they give lenders over a 
firm are some of the most striking changes in Chapter 11 practice over the last twenty 
years. The reorganization law set out in the United States Code has remained largely 
unchanged, but the control that the debtor’s managers once possessed in Chapter 11 
proceedings has been greatly reduced.153 For the firms that are likely to survive as going 
concerns, professional investors ensure that they remain in control, regardless of 
whether the firm is inside of bankruptcy or out.154 
We are not troubled by such a shift in bankruptcy practice. As a comparative matter, 
the senior lender who will not be paid in full will more likely exercise control in a sensi-
ble fashion than will managers whose net worth depends on continuation or a bank-
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 ruptcy judge whose training is usually not in business operations. Regardless of this 
normative judgment, however, little can be done to change this state of affairs. A change 
in the Bankruptcy Code to limit creditor control is unlikely to be effective. The senior 
lenders largely control the time of the Chapter 11 petition. Their investment contracts 
ensure that when the firm approaches financial distress, its continued operations de-
pend on the willingness of the lender to continue the financing of ongoing operations. 
Hence rewriting the bankruptcy laws to limit the lenders’ control inside of bankruptcy 
will simply make them increase the control they exercise outside of bankruptcy. Our 
principal point here, however, concerns the central premise of reorganization law—that 
firms in financial distress lack a coherent allocation of control rights. To be sure, a firm 
might find itself caught up in a sudden crisis, and no single investor may be able to take 
control. But these cases are increasingly rare. Even when they do arise, the traditional 
reorganization is still unnecessary as only the assets can be readily sold. 
B.  Going-Concern Sales and the Changing Bankruptcy Forum 
Going-concern sales have long been the method of choice for dealing with firms that 
could not pay their debts. They were commonplace in the textile industry during the era 
of Ermen & Engels. Given the developments in capital markets, such sales are increas-
ingly possible. Thus, asset sales can occur either when control rights are allocated to 
those with their money on the line, or when control rights are not so well assigned. In 
either case, the buyer of the assets takes them and applies a new capital structure. 
The market for selling firms as going concerns is well-developed.155 In such a world, 
a straightforward path exists for keeping the assets of the firm together and reestablish-
ing coherent control rights. In Sweden auctions are the only path available for financially 
distressed firms that end up in bankruptcy and they seem to work well there even for 
small firms.156 Indeed, the principal obstacles standing in the way of selling a financially 
distressed firm outside of bankruptcy in this country may stem from impediments the 
legal system puts in place. 
Under state law, if the firm that is being sold merges into the buyer, the buyer gets 
the assets and the liabilities of the old firm. In theory, however, one can buy all the assets 
in return for cash. 157 Several obstacles stand in the way, however. First, a buyer of the 
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 assets takes them subject to what security interests the firm’s creditors enjoy.158 Second, 
the de facto merger doctrine may give even unsecured creditors the right to reach the 
assets after they have been sold. In some jurisdictions, a court enjoys the power to re-
characterize a transaction that the parties labeled as an outright sale of assets as a merger 
in which the buyer assumed the liabilities of the old firm as well as the assets.159 A poten-
tial buyer of the assets of a distressed firm may balk at a purchase that can bring with it 
more liabilities than assets. 
When the number of creditors of a financially distressed firm is small enough, sales 
do proceed. When the number of investors is large, however, those in control of the firm 
(typically its senior creditors) are likely to use Chapter 11 to sell the assets of the firm as 
a going concern. Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for selling assets free and clear of all 
claims even before a plan of reorganization is put in place.160 A firm in financial distress 
that seeks to sell itself may thus turn to Chapter 11 not to rehabilitate a failing enterprise 
but rather to dispose of it.161 
The case of Qualitech Steel is a typical modern Chapter 11 case.162 Formed in 1996, 
Qualitech was supposed to exploit new technologies for manufacturing specialty steel. 
The two plants it built cost more than $400 million; both took longer than expected to 
build and were more expensive to operate than anticipated. By early 1999, it was still 
spending $10 million a month. The firm filed for bankruptcy. Everyone agreed that it 
should be sold as a going concern. A buyer was found and the sale was consummated 
within four months. This new use of Chapter 11 is one in which the decisions about the 
highest and best use assets are quickly removed from the process. It bears no resem-
blance to the reorganization of a large railroad or the restructuring of a large manufac-
turing operation. 
In addition to the use of Chapter 11 to sell firms as going concerns, it is also used to 
implement a restructuring that those who control the firm cannot effect outside of bank-
ruptcy because of barriers that a nonbankruptcy law puts in their way. The Trust Inden-
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 ture Act prevents investors from writing contracts that allow investors to act as one. It 
stipulates that the payment terms on publicly held debt cannot be altered without the 
consent of the note holder.163 Even when all would agree that a firm has a going-concern 
value, but that the cash flow commitments of the firm are too high, the Trust Indenture 
Act makes an out-of-court restructuring difficult. Each note holder has an incentive to 
balk at writing down her note, hoping that the other note holders will make the neces-
sary sacrifice. A prepackaged bankruptcy allows firms to overcome the holdout prob-
lems that the Act creates.164 It allows a majority of the note holders holding over two-
thirds of the debt to bind the minority.165 Here again, rather than a traditional role, one 
for which it is no longer needed, Chapter 11 is instead being used to implement the 
wishes of those who control a firm’s assets. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 11 can play its traditional role only in environments in which specialized as-
sets exist, where those assets must remain in a particular firm, where control rights are 
badly allocated, and where going concern sales are not possible. Our primary focus here 
has shown that large corporations no longer fit this paradigm. Chapter 11 cannot justify 
its continued existence on its ability to “save” such firms. 
To the extent that any firms contain the necessarily ingredients for an old-fashioned 
“successful” Chapter 11, they are likely to be small enterprises.166 Firm-specific assets can 
exist in these environments, often in the form of the human capital of the owner-
manager. The restaurant is worth much less without the celebrity chef, as is the jewelry 
store in a small city that rests upon the relationships the jeweler has developed over the 
course of decades. 
Small firms are also most likely to have haphazard capital structures. Their size 
makes them more vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Unusually bad weather, a single 
lawsuit by a disgruntled employee, or a cost overrun on a building project can render 
them insolvent. Some creditors have had long-term relationships with the firm, but lack 
control rights or speedy recourse to legal remedies. Apart from the tax collector, these 
most commonly include small landlords and unions that are owed pension payments. 
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 Other creditors are owed money from a one-time interaction. In many small Chapter 11 
cases, the precipitating event is someone other than an institutional lender trying to en-
force a judgment (a disgruntled ex-employee, dissatisfied customer, contractor from a 
failed expansion effort). These are precisely the types of claimants who may not be the 
best at making sensible and level-headed decisions about the future of the firm. 
Bankruptcy judges are asked to identify quickly who can make it and who cannot. 
There is evidence that bankruptcy judges do this job well.167 But even granting that they 
do, we have to be realistic about the types of firms that are being saved. We have electri-
cal subcontractors, mom-and-pop restaurants, and retailers with high mark-ups. There 
are few employees, and turnover of employees in these firms tends to be high. The prin-
cipal value of preserving such small firms is that it allows their owners to continue to 
enjoy the psychic benefit of running their own business. The costs fall disproportionately 
on nonadjusting creditors. One can make the case for a law that facilitates the survival of 
such firms, but the case is not an easy or compelling one. The days when reorganization 
law promised substantial benefits are gone.  
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